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From	 “effective	 multilateralism”	 in	 the	 European	 Security	 Strategy	 to	 a	 “rules-
based	international	order”	in	the	Global	Strategy,	the	EU	has	been	at	the	forefront	
of	 supporting	 global	 governance.	 Yet	 global	 governance	 is	 increasingly	 under	
pressure	and	pundits	are	now	regularly	 talking	about	the	post-liberal	order.	How	
does	 the	 EU	 implement	 the	 Global	 Strategy	 with	 its	 focus	 on	 a	 rules-based	
international	order	against	the	background	of	Trump's	"America	First",	 the	BRICS	












Even	within	 the	Brussels	bubble,	 the	emergence	of	a	 "post-liberal	order"	 is	 increasingly	 the	 talk	of	







The	 challenge	 of	 the	 post-liberal	 order	 therefore	 puts	 constraints	 on	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 EU	 to	
implement	the	Global	Strategy.	In	addition,	it	also	puts	the	EU	itself	on	the	defensive.	The	latter	is	a	
new	development.	Much	of	 the	post–Cold	War	period	was	 about	projecting	 EU	 standards	 abroad,	
not	about	defending	 the	status	quo.	Occasionally,	 the	EU	was	described	as	a	"post-modern	actor",	
which	meant	that	the	EU	would	also	need	to	develop	security	capabilities	to	deal	with	the	rest	of	the	
world	 ("In	 the	 jungle,	 one	must	 use	 the	 laws	 of	 the	 jungle").2	Yet	 this	 also	was	 about	 exerting	 EU	
influence	over	the	rest	of	the	world.		
	
This	article	argues	 that	 for	 reasons	of	 self-preservation,	 it	 is	 critically	 important	 that	 the	EU	makes	
immediately	work	 of	 the	 ambitions	 of	 the	Global	 Strategy.	 It	 is	 difficult	 to	 imagine	 the	 EU	 staying	
strong	where	the	rest	of	the	structure	of	global	governance	is	coming	down.	While	this	objective	is	
acknowledged	 in	 the	 Global	 Strategy	with	 its	 emphasis	 on	 support	 for	 a	 rules-based	 international	
order,	we	 can	 only	 conclude	 that	 the	 implementation	 has	 so	 far	 been	weak.	 The	 EU	 is	more	 of	 a	
bystander	 as	 the	 edifice	 of	 global	 governance	 comes	 down.	 Furthermore,	 the	 new	 EU	 leadership,	





While	 discussions	 on	 the	 end	 of	 the	 American	 world	 order	 go	 some	 while	 back,3	the	 election	 of	
Donald	Trump	as	US	President	in	November	2016	sparked	immediately	a	debate	on	the	post-liberal	
order.	Foreign	Affairs	 dedicated	 the	 cover,	 and	 a	 substantial	 section,	 of	 its	 January/February	 2017	
issue	 to	 the	 topic	 "Out	of	Order?	 The	 Future	of	 the	 International	 System".4	This,	 in	 turn,	 triggered	
                                                
1See,	 e.g.,	 Anthony	 Dworkin	 and	 Mark	 Leonard,	 “Can	 Europe	 Save	 the	 World	 Order?”,	 24	 May	 2018,	
https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/can_europe_save_the_world_order;	 Sven	 Biscop,	 ”1919-2019:	
How	 to	Make	Peace	Last?	European	Strategy	and	 the	Future	of	 the	World	Order”,	 in	Egmont	Security	Policy	
Briefs,	No.	106	(2019),	http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2019/01/SPB102.pdf			
2Robert	 Cooper,	Breaking	 of	 Nations:	 Order	 and	 Chaos	 in	 the	 Twenty-first	 Century,	 New	 York:	 Grove	 Press,	
2004,	p.	62.	
3Fareed	 Zakaria,	 The	 Post-American	World:	 And	 the	 Rise	 of	 the	 Rest,	 London,	 Penguin	 Press,	 2008;	 Amitav	
Acharya,	The	End	of	American	World	Order,	Cambridge,	Polity	Press,	2014;	G.	John	Ikenberry,	Liberal	Leviathan:	
The	 Origins,	 Crisis,	 and	 Transformation	 of	 the	 American	World	 Order,	 Princeton,	 Princeton	 University	 Press,	
2012.		





considerable	 further	 debate.	 While	 some	 argued	 that	 the	 current	 "liberal	 international	 order"	 is	




that	 the	 system	 of	 global	 governance	 is	 under	 considerable	 pressure.	 All	 sorts	 of	 international	
organizations,	 global	 governance	 arrangements	 and	 international	 agreements,	 which	 the	 EU	
cherishes	or	at	 the	very	 least	participates	 in	and	abides	by,	are	currently	under	 threat.	The	Trump	






the	example	 that	 it	 sets	 for	other	countries.	Burundi	quit	 the	 International	Criminal	Court	 in	2017,	
the	Philippines	will	 leave	 in	March	2019,	 and	South	Africa	nearly	 left	 as	well.	 Japan	 is	quitting	 the	
International	 Whaling	 Commission	 and	 will	 start	 commercial	 hunting	 again	 in	 July	 2019.	 The	 list	
continues	 and	 this	 is	 powerful	 evidence	 of	 what	 the	 unraveling	 of	 international	 order	 looks	 like.	
While	all	 these	developments	cannot	be	blamed	on	the	White	House,	 it	 is	also	clear	that	there	are	
currently	no	hegemonic	pressures	to	prevent	them.	
	
The	 Trump	 administration	 understandably	 takes	 a	 lot	 of	 the	 blame,	 but	 the	 challenge	 to	 the	
international	 liberal	 order	 and	 particularly	 the	 status	 quo	 cherished	 by	 the	 EU	 is	 broader.	 The	
emerging	 powers,	 particularly	 Brazil,	 Russia,	 India,	 China	 and	 South	 Africa	 (BRICS),	 had	 already	 in	
2013	presented	the	 international	community	with	a	whole	wish	 list	 for	global	governance	reform.9	
While	 the	 demands	 of	 the	 BRICS	 have	 gone	 relatively	 quiet	 –	 despite	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 New	
Development	 Bank,	 the	Asian	 Infrastructure	 Investment	 Bank,	 and	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 Belt	 and	
Road	 Initiative	 –	 the	 fundamental	 challenge	 to	 how	 the	 EU	 prefers	 the	world	 has	 not	 gone	 away.	
Similar	things	can	be	said	about	the	situation	in	the	South	China	Sea	or	the	Korean	Peninsula.	With	




































First,	 the	unilateral	 sanctions	 imposed	by	 the	United	States	on	 Iran	have	extraterritorial	effect	and	
thus	 also	 affect	 European	 companies	 trading	with	 Iran.	 For	 instance,	 they	 have	 resulted	 in	 Airbus	
having	to	cancel	its	contracts.11	Furthermore,	as	a	result	of	US	pressure,	the	Iranian	currency	has	all	
but	collapsed	in	2018	putting	considerable	pressure	on	the	Iranian	middle	class.	Second,	the	EU	had	
to	 (belatedly)	 adopt	 targeted	 sanctions	 as	 well	 on	 Iran	 as	 a	 result	 of	 government-sponsored	
assassinations	 in	 Denmark,	 France	 and	 the	 Netherlands.12	This	 shows	 how	 fragile	 the	 Iran	 deal	 –	
lauded	as	the	most	important	achievement	of	the	EU	in	years	–	actually	is.	In	the	most	recent	Council	
conclusions,	 the	EU	complained	about	 Iran's	behaviour,	 from	Syria	 to	Yemen,	ballistic	missiles	 and	
human	 rights.	 It	 notes	 that	 "existing	 tensions	 and	 distrust	 in	 the	 region	 should	 not	 be	 further	
exacerbated".13	
	
Noteworthy	 is	 furthermore	 the	 increased	emphasis	 in	2018	on	EU	support	 for	 the	United	Nations,	
and	 particularly	 for	 the	 reform	 effort	 led	 by	 Secretary	 General	 António	 Guterres.	 This	 included	
among	other	 things	 a	 visit	 to	Brussels.	 Furthermore,	 the	EU	has	provided	 strong	 support	 for	 a	UN	
headquarters	reform,	which	materialized	in	January	2019.	While	the	UN	reform	was	sorely	needed,	
the	 reforms	 are	 ultimately	 about	management	 and	 delivery	 rather	 than	 a	 new	 agenda	 for	 global	
governance.		
	
















than	rules-based	 international	order).14	To	a	certain	degree	this	 is	 really	against	 the	odds.	After	all,	
trade	 agreements	 are	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 international	 liberal	 order.	 And	 indeed,	 the	 EU	 has	
continued	with	these	agreements	against	popular	objections	over	CETA	and	TTIP.	At	the	same	time,	









underlines	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 Global	 Strategy	 and	 its	 implementation.	 At	 the	 same	 it	 is	 a	 tall	
order.	 And	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 that	 the	Global	 Strategy	 itself	 is	 actually	 sufficient	when	 it	 comes	 to	 EU	





                                                
14EEAS,	Implementing	the	EU	Global	Strategy	Year	2,	June	2018,	
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_annual_report_year_2.pdf	
